fleeing Nazi Germany, and by European philosophies of science that reconceived what it meant to be scientific in the sciences of society.
It is one of the great strengths of the book that we get filiations of ideas and issues carefully situated in their social and personal contexts. Rutherford is not content to understand only what the Institutionalists wrote; his is a fine-grained reconstruction of the professional networks that they built, and in which they wrote, taught, advised, hired, feuded and lobbied.
Rutherford has chosen to call Institutionalism a movement and this requires establishing a selfconscious unity of people, of ideas, and of program. I find the book's evidence on this score persuasive.
Almost in passing, Rutherford debunks various myths of Institutionalist economics, which, have together served as a kind of standard narrative. The myths are: one, that Institutionalist economics merely dissented to orthodoxy rather than make positive contributions; two, that Institutionalist economics was best represented even personified by Thorstein Veblen; and three, that IE was unscientific, no more than a compilation of economic facts awaiting a theory or, as Ronald Coase put it, a fire. Rutherford had already challenged these canards in earlier work that the book gathers together, but the force of a full history puts them to rest.
Institutionalism was far more than mere dissent to orthodoxy; it attracted some of the best minds in American economics between the wars and built a network of scholars who were wellestablished and well-funded at leading universities -Chicago, Wisconsin and Columbia, as well as research institutes, such as Brookings and Wesley Clair Mitchell's National Bureau of Economic Research. When Institutionalists did quarrel with orthodox economics, they most often did so from a position of intellectual and institutional strength. Indeed, the orthodoxy they critiqued was not obviously a mainstream: American economics in the 1920s and 1930s was decidedly plural, with permeable and fluid intellectual boundaries (Morgan and Rutherford 1998). Institutionalist work on theory of the firm, and Institutionalist criticisms of untestable theory, for example, clearly influenced orthodox economics.
The second myth reads Institutional economics as Veblenism. Rutherford acknowledges Veblen's influence, but, in his telling, even if Veblen fathered Institutional economics, Veblen did not raise it. Veblen, after all, was 61 years old when Walton Hamilton published his manifesto. Institutional economics was named, raised and shaped by others, notably Walton Hamilton and John R. Commons, who did the hard work of parenting -crafting methodologies, setting research agendas, securing funding, building institutions, and forming alliances.
The third myth makes Institutionalist economics unscientific. The book's terminal date is 1947, the year in which Tjalling Koopmans disparaged Institutionalism as mere measurement without theory. There was, it can be acknowledged, some merit in Koopmans' charge. The impetus to provide a more realistic picture of human action was a key aspect of the appeal of Institutionalist economics, but its promise to provide psychological foundations to economics was a promise that remained unfulfilled (p. 352). Rutherford acknowledges that Institutionalism's psychological foundations remained in a "vague and undeveloped state," a deficit that contributed, moreover, to the ad hoc rather than systematic character of Institutionalist theory (ibid).
Theory, however, is no more sufficient for science than is measurement, and, granted its own Pragmatism-informed conception of science, Institutionalist economics was scientific.
Indeed Institutional economics began life with a critique of orthodox economics as too speculative and deductive, and thus unscientific. As John Maurice Clark put it in 1927, "[T]he whole [Institutionalist] movement may be interpreted as a demand for a procedure which appears more adequately scientific." One might almost, Clark said, "make [Institutionalism] coextensive with the scientific point of view-in economic study," where the scientific point of view meant "studying the interrelations of business and other social institutions as they are and not through the medium of any simplified abstractions such as are employed by classical, static, and marginal economics" (Clark 1927: 221, 271 in science, celebrated science in a religious idiom, and believed that "conduct in accord with the ethic of science could be religiously fulfilling" (Hollinger 1989: 123) . The progressives' venerated science not merely because they believed scientific knowledge enabled improvement of economy and society, but also because they regarded science as a place where the socially minded could find religious meaning in scientific inquiry's ethos of objectivity, self-denial, pursuit of truth, and service to a cause greater than oneself.
The end of the First World War usefully marks the end of the Social Gospel in American economics, and indeed of any significant religious influence in American economics. The
Institutionalists did, however, carry forward a form of the progressives' "intellectual gospel,"
one that moved away from the religious significance progressives found therein, but continued to venerate science. The First World War did not discredit science, or its virtues for economics, as can be seen in the scientistic rhetoric of John Maurice Clark and other Institutionalists.
The decline of Darwinism's outsized influence upon American economics
Darwinism was the master metaphor of the Progressive Era, enough that it is difficult to over-estimate the influence of evolutionary thinking upon Progressive Era social scientists. (1905) (1906) (1907) (1908) (1909) (1910) (1911) (1912) (1913) (1914) , to a mere 20,000 per year (Leonard 2005) . It ended Japanese immigration altogether.
Evolutionary concepts retained currency in Institutional economics, but the
Institutionalists gradually moved away from the progressive economists' emphasis on heredity, selection, fitness and race, using "evolution" to denote the historical and cultural contingency of economic processes.
Decline of the idealization of the state as social organism
When Walton Hamilton presented his Institutionalist manifesto in December of 1918, Armistice Day (November 11 th ) had only just ended hostilities, and the appalling wreckage of World War I was already in view. Irving Fisher's Presidential address to the AEA ("Economists in Public Service"), given at the same meeting where Hamilton unveiled his manifesto, spoke to the perils of economic expertise, when he darkly referred to the German political economists as prostitutes of a criminal regime. "We received from Germany the idea . . . of making economics of service to 'the state,'" said Fisher. But, he continued, "the war's revelations have made us realize, to our horror, that 'the state' served by the German economists . . . was simply the Hohenzollern dynasty. We now know that German professors . . . have prostituted their professional services to serve Germany's criminal purposes" (Fisher 1919: 7) .
American progressive economists admired and advocated the "German model" they were exposed to as graduate students, and they had, moreover, given little thought to the risk that the state might become something other than the organic embodiment of an enlightened people's Progressive Era economics, and it survived the war, indeed was invigorated by it.
The First World War as a positive benefit to social control
pensions" (payments to single mothers with dependent children), capped working hours, set minimum wages, taxed inheritances, adopted antitrust statutes, and banned corporate donations to political campaigns.
Economic progressives were instrumental in effecting nearly all these Progressive Era reforms, and they also, increasingly, advised or staffed the government bureaus created by the legislation they promoted (and sometimes even drafted). The growing government demand for economic expertise in the early 20 th century, moreover, reinforced the institutional status of the university as the incubator and supplier of economic expertise (Porter 2003: 39) . By 1915, the training of scientific experts for public service was deemed a university function fully co-equal with the traditional goals of advancing knowledge and instructing students. 8 Before American entry into the war, then, there was a social control infrastructure, in the universities and in the government bureaus, blueprinted and built by the progressive economists and their reform allies.
It was still rudimentary, more foundations than an entire edifice, but the Institutionalist generation of economists had access to professorial chairs and the seats in government commissions and bureaus.
American entry into the war bolstered the social control infrastructure, by expanding and fortifying the regulatory state, and, especially, by hiring economists to direct economic planning for war mobilization. Large wartime expenditures and decreased tariff revenues from the wartime decline in international trade gave rise to the Revenue Act of 1917, a crucial watershed in the development of the regulatory state (Brownlee 1990 ). The Revenue Act raised federal income tax rates, steeply increased income-tax progressivity (its top rate was 63%), expanded the income tax base, and taxed estates along with excessive war profits (ibid). Though American involvement in the war was relatively brief at nineteen months, the Federal government, even after demobilization, remained almost three times its size before the war.
9
During the war, the U.S. War Industries Board introduced Americans to business planning methods applied by the government to entire economy -it coordinated most government purchasing, determined the allocation of resources, established priorities in output, restricted the alcohol trade, and fixed prices on commodities in over 60 industries (Fogel 2000 Gay and his colleagues seized the opportunity to put their business organizational ideas into government practice (Cuff 1989) . When Grosvenor Clarkson, WIB member and historian, intellectual "revolution," impossible to ignore (Dewey 1929 (Dewey [1918 : 557). War collectivism also emboldened Veblen (1921) , who conceived of the U.S. economy as a single, giant firm, governed by a soviet of central-planning engineers -not state ownership exactly, but a kind of planners' trusteeship. The war was a boon for economic planning, and, thereby, for the enterprise of American social control more generally.
Conclusion
Progressives like Ely, Commons and Edward A. Ross had baldly characterized experts as superior men who could, by dint of not just their superior training but also their superior virtue, interpret the "collective mind of society" and act in its best interests. This heroic, elitist self-10 My discussion of the WIB is indebted McGerr 2003, especially pp. 283-299. conception of the economic expert, like the German-inflected view of the state as a social organism, waned after the war. Institutionalists generally eschewed the progressives' elitism; the progressive expert was necessary to identify the social good, whereas the Institutionalist expert merely served the social good. Still, the progressives' extravagant faith in expert social sciencethe necessary condition for the vaulting ambition of social control -clearly survived the war and flourished, albeit in this more technocratic vein.
My account here of the Progressive Era origins of science and social control in American
Institutionalist economics is, I hope, while necessarily preliminary, worthy of further development. It is but one of many lines of inquiry that have been and will be stimulated by Rutherford's exemplary history.
